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In his new book, La Machine sensible, Stefan Kristensen conceives the human 
mind as a sensible machine: a machine that seeks to stabilize incoming fluxes of 
sensory stimulation, before being rationally reflected. This opens up a thought-
provoking discussion with contemporary phenomenological conceptions of the 
minimal self, which reappears as a technical invention, an artifact produced by the 
sensible machinery that works beyond our conscious grasp and reflective 
understanding. Like the technical object, the minimal self is for Kristensen an artifact 
produced to stabilize the relation between man and his environment. But in La 
Machine sensible technical invention does not amount to the application of a given 
system of knowledge. Machinic invention has its roots in the irrational and becomes 
rational ordering only after having fulfilled its primordial function: the organization 
of matter by life.  
 
For the sake of brevity, this review will focus strictly on the theoretical issues that 
animate La Machine sensible. The true strength and originality of Kristensen’s book 
lies in combining a rich conceptual framework with detailed commentaries of 
empirical work both in psychopathology and in twentieth century art. Of the three 
parts that make up the book, I will discuss only the first (“The Self and the Machine”) 
and the third (“The Essence of the Machine”), the second (“The Machine and the 
Figuration of the Self”) being entirely devoted to the motive of the machine and the 
figuration of the self in art brut, James Tilly Matthews, Fernand Deligny, Victor 
Tausk, Bruce Nauman, Marcel Duchamp, Jean Epstein and Jean-Luc Godard. 
Kristensen has a deep background both in the phenomenological and 
psychoanalytical traditions and his astute appreciation of their respective virtues does 
not make him any less perceptive of their respective weaknesses. Honest about its 
goals and the unresolved puzzles pertaining to its rather brief examination of 
phenomena of biological organization, the book is most sharp in its ability to set up a 
dialogue between Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Szondi, Maldiney and Deleuze & Guattari. 
With that in mind, La Machine sensible is highly recommendable for anyone 
interested in the crossovers between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, and the way 
these can open up an original reflection on contemporary visual art.  
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2. Aisthesis Disturbed: Machinic Delusions 
 
The first part of Kristensen’s book begins by turning to the literature on 
schizophrenia, in which the motif of an ‘influencing machine’ (une machine à 
influencer) represents a particular kind of delusion that is important for a good 
understanding of schizophrenia. The delusion of an influencing machine stands for an 
experience in which the patient is convinced to be manipulated through a machine, 
which itself remains beyond his or her grasp. Examining the subjective dimension of 
schizophrenia, Kristensen approaches this delusional experience as a particular kind 
of feeling. This avoids categorizing schizophrenia as a disturbance of either the 
psyche or the soma, since feeling usually involves both. Kristensen argues that 
whatever the person’s predominant schizophrenic symptoms, these can be regarded as 
instances, appearances, expressions of the same disturbance, the same fundamental 
kind of psychotic feeling of an influencing machine.  
 
To situate the disturbance at the level of feeling is not to deny, however, the 
neurobiological basis of schizophrenia. Discussing the early clinical work of Viktor 
Tausk and Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault in the light of recent work of Alfred Kraus, 
Thomas Fuchs, Louis A. Sass and Josef Parnas’ phenomenological Examination of 
Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE), Kristensen acknowledges that neurally based 
cognitive dysfunctions often play an important role, and indeed that they may often 
play the causal role in terms of kicking off symptoms. This does not mean, however, 
that subjective experiential phenomena, together with subjective responses to these 
phenomena, may not also play a key role. Rather than proposing an either/or 
dichotomy between neurological explanation and phenomenological description, our 
author follows Parnas in the viewpoint that phenomenology may just as well offer an 
explanatory contribution for the understanding of psychotic delusions. Accordingly, 
‘the investigation concerns here the sense of this experience of alterity, from the point 
of view of the subject undergoing it’ (29). 
 
In the most general terms, it is for Kristensen a person’s most immediate and 
fundamental, affective relationship to self and to world, which is disturbed in 
schizophrenic psychosis. This disturbance is a feeling of losing contact and 
connectedness with the world, of withdrawing into a world of one’s own, and of 
sensing the world as a hostile otherness. In schizophrenia, patients lose their sense of 
ownership; they seem to have no sense of property, not of a world but also not of 
themselves, even to the point of owning their bodies. It is this alienating feeling, 
which the patient’s language is unable to articulate and make sense of, and which 
may lead to a breakdown of personality, a cleavage of several personalities, and to 
several kinds of corporeal symptoms.  
 
The sense of losing possession or control, at once over the world and over oneself, 
implies that possession, power or control lie elsewhere. The delusion of the 
influencing machine involves ‘the experience of domination, of a relation of 
asymmetrical force, which the machine is a particularly emblematic image of’ (36). 
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One may certainly have the feeling of great energy and feel compelled to use it, but 
one seems to have no power to control it. It is as though something else is exercising 
this control and the patient does not know what this other is: he or she feels it as a 
foreign power that is mechanically triggered by an external causality.  
 
Whatever form these experiences take, their presence is for the subject always an 
ordeal that gives rise to different strategies to confront these impulsions, whose 
essential trait is that the subject cannot escape them. It is due to this experience of 
passivity and powerlessness on the noetic level that one can speak of a machinic 
phenomenon on the noematic level (taking up a Husserlian vocabulary here) (30).  
 
In an important concluding passage of the first chapter, Kristensen argues that one 
shouldn’t understand the schizophrenic delusion only negatively, as the delusional 
construction of a threat. Following Kraus, Fuchs and the psychoanalyst Ludivine 
Beillard-Robbert, he argues the schizophrenic delusion is ‘a fundamentally 
ambiguous phenomenon’ (13, 23) that can be considered at once as a symptom of 
disturbance and as an act of resistance, offering a certain stabilization. Indeed, ‘the 
simple fact that a hallucination is produced, that an image be drawn, that a text be 
written, either in front of the psychiatrist or in the most intimate reclusion, means that 
the delusional subject is in a process of resistance in the experience that he goes 
through’ (36). Kristensen emphasizes this point to debut the idea that the delusion 
would be itself a phenomenon empty of meaning. One must distinguish the patient’s 
primordial experiences, which appear to him or her as meaningless, and the delusion, 
which is produced as an attempt to make sense of them. Without this distinction, one 
cannot account for the fact that the schizophrenic is still a self and that he or she 
maintains a perspective onto the world. Like the drowning man who cannot swim, the 
patient continues to struggle1:  
 
The creation of an influencing machine in the psychic realm of the schizophrenic 
subject corresponds to a situation of complete powerlessness within which, 
nonetheless, the possibility of emancipation is given, although it is remote and 
inaccessible. This is exactly the paradoxical meaning of the delusion: to express the 
need of liberation by giving form to the confinement (38). 
 
3. The Bodily Self and the Sensible Machine 
 
Kristensen’s understanding of the delusion of the influencing machine as at once a 
passive confrontation to something unknown and an active response to it, is central 
not only to his analysis of schizophrenia, but also to his philosophical understanding 
of selfhood (ipseity) in general. Against a conception of the self as characterized by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This metaphor of drowning appears in an article by the phenomenologist Waltraut Stein. She writes: 
‘Like the drowning man, the schizophrenic continues to struggle with surprising energy. He tries to 
“learn to swim” to come to terms with his psychosis in some way. Perhaps if he can go along with it 
for a time it will cease to disturb him so and he can find a way to overcome it, he thinks. But 
eventually he finds that it is too late and that there is no going along with it. Whatever he does, this 
power is always against him. Usually he finds that his efforts even increase his sense of being 
dispossessed’. (Stein, 1970: 99). 
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full-fledged autonomy and self-reflective transparency, Kristensen argues the self is 
‘structurally constituted by the internal tension between necessity and liberty’ (37). 
More precisely, Kristensen proposes a two-level model of the self, whereby the 
higher-level properties (the intentional, cognitive structure which has a degree of 
autonomy from the world) emerge from lower-level, sub-personal and non-conscious 
dynamical processes that act deterministically. The reflective, cognitive structure of 
the self, which is the mark of subjective autonomy, is for our author constituted by 
three fundamental, pre-reflective dimensions of experience: temporality, embodiment 
and self-differentiation inherent to pre-reflective experience. For Kristensen, these 
pre-reflective dimensions manifest dimensions of internal or intra-subjective alterity, 
which are never fully dominated and controlled by the subject. In Dan Zahavi’s 
terms, which Kristensen cites approvingly:  
 
Subjectivity seems to be constituted in a way that allows it to relate to itself in an 
othering way. This self-alteration is something inherent in reflection. It is not 
something that reflection can ever overcome (Zahavi 2004: 150). 
 
Although the pre-reflective, embodied level of the self is perpetually self-differing 
within the ‘diachronical’, egoless flow of time-consciousness, Kristensen agrees with 
Zahavi that one can speak already at this rudimentary level of a ‘minimal self’ (122).2 
However, he disagrees with Zahavi’s view that minimal self does not depend upon 
social interaction for its development and/or its sustenance. Following Matthew 
Ratcliffe, Kristensen argues the constitution of minimal self should be re-
conceptualized in interpersonal terms: ‘the primitive level of self-experience is 
always already of an intersubjective nature’ (126). 
 
Our author develops this reconceptualization around two ideas. The first is that 
minimal self and alterity construct each other reciprocally through a pre-reflective 
libidinal and social dimension of ‘body schema’ (47, 54, 64). Drawing on the late 
work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the neurologist and psychoanalyst Paul Schilder 
(whose influence on Merleau-Ponty he reconstructs in detail), Kristensen conceives 
bodily ‘sensing itself’ (le sentir lui-même (49)) as a perceptual process that happens 
independently from conscious intentionality and reflection, and is interdependent on 
action. According to this account, sensing is a skillful bodily activity in which 
perception and action are constitutively interdependent, unlike at the personal level, 
where the action a perception leads to may depend on the agent’s intentions (105, 
271). In Schilder’s sense, the body schema designates an integrated set of dynamic 
sensorimotor processes that organize perception and action in a sub-personal and non-
conscious manner. As such, the body schema must be distinguished from what is 
sometimes called the ‘body-image’, which is the body as an intentional object of 
consciousness, i.e. the body as experienced as owned by the experiencing subject. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In Zahavi’s characterization, the ‘minimal self’ designates the most fundamental sense of subjective 
‘mineness’ or ‘first-personal givenness’ that accompanies all of our experiences and functions as a 
condition for the spatiotemporal structuring of experience. Cf., Dan Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring 
Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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example, the body schema appropriates certain habitual postures and movements 
automatically. The body schema also incorporates certain significant parts of its 
environment into its own schema: the painter’s brush becomes an operative extension 
of her hand; the blind person’s cane becomes a sensing extension of the hand.  
 
At this primordial level, a minimal self emerges from a libidinal, bodily relation to 
alterity. That is to say, the sensorimotor contribution of the body schema is actually 
constitutive of selfhood, rather than being merely causally implicated in experiences. 
But this dimension of embodiment is not of the order of personal ownership: the 
libidinal production of the bodily self through body schema precedes the constitution 
of an ego that distinguishes itself from its libidinal investments, and the primordial 
relation between self and alterity is characterized by a ‘fundamental polymorphism’ 
(52). This means that the libidinal body forms with the environment a system of 
reciprocal implication, stimulation and expression, a pre-personal, essentially 
‘anonymous and general existence’ in which there is ‘confusion of an individual body 
schema with that of the other’ (53). Being essentially anonymous, non-personal and 
non-conscious, the body schema forms a ‘sensible machine’ that is not 
phenomenologically available to the reflective subject: it is neither the perception or 
imagination, nor the cognitive understanding, nor the emotional apprehension of ‘my’ 
body, but rather the libidinal drives that organize the body as it spontaneously 
interacts with its environment.  
 
From this perspective, the unconscious is this libidinal dimension of my being in the 
world; if it remains inaccessible to consciousness and to explicit intersubjective 
sharing, this is not due to its radically intimate [psychic] character, but rather to its pre-
reflective, corporeal generality (56). 
 
As Henri Maldiney writes, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty, the bodily sensing itself 
forms the ‘untouchable’ side of the self, ‘that of the self which I will never touch [cela 
de moi que je ne toucherai jamais]’ (Maldiney, 2007: 138). 
 
The second idea is that human subjectivity, that is to say, full-fledged selfhood 
with a degree of ‘ontological depth’ (123), emerges from a cultural-reflective 
dimension of interpersonal relations and symbolical-cognitive structures, such as 
language. Our author is fully aware that this second idea, as well as the identification 
of the libidinal basis of embodiment with the impersonal, non-subjective order of the 
unconscious, brings him particularly close to the position of Lacan. In fact, one of the 
strengths of the second chapter of La Machine sensible lies in showing how – despite 
the different conceptions of the unconscious in the early Merleau-Ponty and Lacan– 
the late Merleau-Ponty’s identification of the unconscious with the anonymous ‘flesh’ 
(chair) of the world is compatible with Lacan’s views on the discontinuous, 
problematic relation between consciousness and the unconscious. Despite valuing this 
proximity, however, Kristensen is also critical of Lacan. In conceiving the 
developmental emancipation to the symbolical dimension of subjectivity, Lacan 
neglected the importance of the productive role of the libidinal body and of affectivity 
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in the constitution of the self. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, Lacan’s conception of the 
symbolic led him into an ‘idealist deviation’ (58, 63), conceiving the emergence of 
subjectivity strictly in terms of the symbolic and conscious mediation of instinctually 
driven life. For the generative constitution of the self, a model which does not do 
right to its bodily, affective, emotional and temporal constitution remains incomplete 
indeed. 
 
By contrast, the psychoanalytically inspired work of the phenomenologist Henri 
Maldiney and the schizo-analytical work of Félix Guattari (both with and without 
Gilles Deleuze), demonstrate for Kristensen the possibility of a constructive 
conversation between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, which is in the spirit of 
Merleau-Ponty’s late project of an ontology of the generativity of the flesh. Reading 
Guattari, Maldiney, Deleuze and Leopold Szondi in this light (whose influence on 
Deleuze & Guattari he also reconstructs in detail); our author’s goal is as follows: 
 
… to construct a position from which to sketch a critique of the dominant reception of 
Merleau-Ponty in the domain of the theory of the self – a reception that draws mostly 
on the Phenomenology of Perception and leaves aside the objections and new 
perspectives in his seminars at the Collège de France and in the corpus of The Visible 
and the Invisible (47). 
 
4. The Minimal Life of the Self: Three Challenges 
 
There are three general theoretical points that are key to Kristensen’s two-level 
model of the self that are helpful to see where his challenges lie. These points concern 
the emergence of self, the relational role of the environment, and the relation between 
the personal and the sub-personal.  
 
i). Emergence: In thinking about the productive character of the self-organizing 
dynamics of sensorimotor processes, Kristensen seeks to conceive of a sub-personal 
level at which the biological and the mental are fundamentally indistinct (108). 
Against Szondi, who still remained caught in a dualism between blind sub-personal 
biological processes and the autonomous, mental realm of the self (‘le moi pontifex’ 
(106)), Kristensen aims to show how minimal self emerges in development from 
repetitive cycles of sub-personal, ‘infra-subjective’ sensorimotor processes of 
perception and action (235). In a touching passage on the work of the Feldenkrais 
therapist and choreographer Mara Vinadia (178-181), Kristensen notes how higher 
level cognitive processes and symbolical, linguistic forms of communication can be 
entrapped by sensorimotor disorders; as in the case of an autistic girl of three years 
and nine months old who expressed herself only by crying and shouting, who didn’t 
allow any eye contact and who didn’t let anyone get closer to her than three meters.  
 
Faced with any kind of frustration or transgression of these limits, she would 
respond with immediate violence, bending her body like an arc and hitting her head 
against the ground. The therapist approaches this situation as follows: keeping her 
distance from the patient, her face and body averted, she takes on a series of 
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immobile bodily postures, holding each figure for a fixed time interval, followed by a 
few steps in the room. When Vinadia arrives at her sixth posture, she notices the child 
has risen and begins to imitate her accurately, step by step. Yet, the patient doesn’t 
imitate her last posture: rather, she begins with the first, forcing Vinadia to start over 
from zero, and maintaining a lag of six between her and Vinadia’s postures. 
Astonishingly, after a number of weeks of repetitive sequences the child allows for 
more and more proximity, imitating Vinadia’s with lags of 5, 4, 3… up to the point of 
allowing the therapist to face her, and moving in perfect unison with her, such that it 
becomes impossible to designate who is initiating and imitating. Eventually, the child 
allows for more people, even strangers, to approach and address her. 
 
Kristensen emphasizes that the initial refusal to enter into relation is not a sign of 
indifference but of a hyper-sensibility to the presence of others – an interpretation 
confirmed by neuro-scientific approaches of autism. The therapist’s work has 
consisted in establishing a reciprocal relation between the child and herself, a 
corporeal relation of sensing reciprocity that restored the sensorimotor dynamics 
constitutive of minimal self. This does not mean, of course, that a sequence of 
physical gestures alone could implement a cognitive state or a sense of possessing a 
self. The main takeaway is rather, that aside from higher-level neural processes, sub-
personal sensorimotor processes of perception and action make a special, constitutive 
contribution to the machinery of selfhood. 
 
ii). Environment: The second issue is about the relational role of the biological 
and social/collective environment and concerns the idea that minimal self is not only 
intimately embodied, but also intimately embedded in its environment. How does 
attention to this environmental embedding contribute something important to an 
understanding of the emergence of minimal self? In this regard, Kristensen 
distinguishes the kinds of account that typically stress features of organic integration, 
unitary functioning and sense-making across different levels of bodily embeddedness, 
from the more radical dynamic viewpoint he finds in Guattari and Deleuze, which 
stresses features of instability, chaos and heterogeneity characteristic of the energetic 
dynamics constitutive of minimal self (244-255).  
 
For Kristensen, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of our perceptible integrations with the 
world in Phenomenology of Perception is exemplary of the first kind of account, as 
he conceives these integrations as the emergence of one unified ‘flesh’ by means of a 
reversible ‘chiasmic’ relation between body and environment. This approach 
emphasizes there is a minimal ‘nucleus’ of stability that constrains and directs the 
ongoing dynamics, a self-organizing nucleus that enables meaningful interactions to 
take place between the system and its environment (254, 294). Kristensen refers in 
this regard to Francisco Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, which defines living 
‘autopoietic machines’ by the self-referential organization of the causal interactions 
taking place in material systems, i.e. the self-referential, recursive organization of the 
causal loops that determine the particular dynamics within or between systems (254, 
260). As the name suggests, autopoietic machines are essentially self-producing: the 
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system produces ‘itself’ through the reciprocal causation between the components of 
the system and relations between them. One might say that from this viewpoint, one 
focuses on the product (minimal self) that emerges from dynamic processes: a 
composed, structured, organizationally closed system of self-production that to a 
certain extent determines the range and meaningfulness of its material interactions.  
 
On the other hand, Guattari and Deleuze’s approach, which Kristensen is more 
sympathetic to, places emphasis on a system’s material, intensive dynamics, which 
are essentially driven by perturbations, ruptures in direction, breakdowns and failures, 
and which have no meaningfulness at all (they can acquire meaningfulness only for 
an eventual emergent system capable of controlling these dynamics). For Kristensen, 
the first, phenomenological point of view, tends to remain too one-sidedly focused 
upon the result: connections of meaning, autonomy and structure (254).The schizo-
analytical viewpoint, however, stresses the primacy of dynamic material processes, 
and as such it emphasizes the heterogeneity underlying all constructed unity, the 
initial ‘chaosmos’ from which all order and stability emerge: 
 
The point of view of the schizophrenic reveals the fact that the machinic assemblages 
[agencements machiniques] do not self-organize according to a meaningful order 
[selon un ordre sensé], but consist in the coexistence of heterogeneous elements whose 
mutual presence creates movements, displacements, production of novelty (245). 
   
Within the phenomenological viewpoint, it is difficult to include the dimension of 
force or intensity. Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the sensible is a philosophy of the birth 
of meaning [la naissance du sens] and as such it tends to suspend or neglect the 
dimension of force. (…) The main merit of the notion of the machine within the 
perspective of a theory of subjectivity is that it allows for the articulation of these two 
dimensions and to make them appear as reciprocal conditions: the force of the machine 
is the condition of manifestation of meaningful forms, and the meaningful forms are 
conditions of apparition of the movements of the machine, which are heterogeneous to 
the register of meaning and which appear precisely as perturbations of meaningful 
structures (269). 
 
iii). The relation between the personal and sub-personal: We have seen that 
instead of assuming minimal self as a kind of a priori form that is necessary for any 
kind of sensorimotor processing or cognition to take place, Kristensen argues that a 
better viewpoint on minimal self should help to understand how it might itself emerge 
from dynamic sensorimotor systems and the role of environmental embeddedness in 
such systems. These two points about emergence and the role of the environment 
naturally have consequences on how to view the relation between the personal and 
the sub-personal. 
 
One way of considering the relation between the sub-personal and the personal is 
to conceive sub-personal sensorimotor processes as a kind of primordial, mute 
intentionality of the animal body with regard to the world – a Merleau-Pontian ‘I 
can’. Again, this insistence on the necessity of a primordial kind of subjective 
structure that is formally present in organic processes of self-regulation and self-
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production points to a tension with Kristensen’s point of view. Drawing on the work 
of Guattari and Deleuze, he stresses that the regulatory structures constitutive of the 
organism are not only constraining, but are themselves also constrained by material 
processes of individuation. These are morphodynamic, structure-making processes 
which grow out of intrinsic physical (thermodynamic, chemical) properties of their 
material elements. Preceding the passage to functional life, which they organize, 
these structure-making processes form a kind of static life that is intermediary 
between inorganic reality and functional life properly speaking. This intermediary 
order between matter and life fully organized is not a property of a self-referential, 
organic machine (a homeostatic, autopoietic, or organizational whole), but rather of 
an inorganic machine (an ontogenetic system of individuation).  
 
Kristensen points out that for Guattari and Deleuze as well the organizational 
closure of psychic systems manifests itself as the emergence of a minimal self, i.e. an 
‘I sense’ (129-130). But this minimal self is always secondary with regard to material 
processes of individuation, which it emerges from. Unlike Varela, Guattari and 
Deleuze do not consider the organism’s unity to be derived from a particular type of 
minimal selfhood or internal unity that is essentially intrinsic to it, over and against 
the mere aggregates encountered in physical nature. What distinguishes them from 
the Varelian view of the organism as subjectivity is that they posit rather something 
like an inorganic machine, which ‘processualizes’ subjectivity. It is not minimal self 
which is the ground of the process of individuation, but rather it is individuation 
which grounds minimal self. 
 
La Machine sensible makes a convincing case that in postulating the essence of 
minimal self is an irreducible first-personness, an intentionality or organizational 
closure, phenomenological viewpoints risk neglecting the material conditions within 
which minimal self is produced and meaningful interactions between the self and its 
environment take place. This is probably due to the fact that these approaches seek to 
refute reductionist approaches to consciousness, which would reduce the latter to its 
material basis. Although Kristensen shares this non-reductionist Husserlian spirit, he 
argues the opposite gesture is no less unfortunate as it risks disregarding the matter 
and keeping the organizational structure, emptied of all “ontic depth” (121). For 
Kristensen, psychic phenomena such as minimal self must also be conceived of in 
materialist terms, which means one must understand sub-personal, generative 
processes also in terms of specific, concrete mechanisms that are applicable to 
material elements. The challenge here is to define the continuity between the 
material, the living and the psychic, whilst acknowledging that material elements are 
‘a-signifying’, i.e. heterogeneous to the semiotic domain in which the living and 
psychic create meaning (65-6, 74). This final challenge, then, is what allows 
Kristensen to inscribe Guattari’s ‘machinic phenomenology’ (80) into the 
phenomenological program as formulated by the late Merleau-Ponty: 
 
The ultimate task of phenomenology as philosophy of consciousness is to understand 
its relationship to non-phenomenology. What resists phenomenology within us – 
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natural being, the ‘barbarous’ source Schelling spoke of – cannot remain outside 
phenomenology and should have its place within it. The philosopher has his shadow, 
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